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The Stratos Brief The Stratos Brief is an analytical publication focused on aerospace, defence, business, and policy.

We turn complex developments into clear, relevant insights for leaders, professionals, and informed readers.

20/09/2026

Another one from NATO Days in Ostrava. This time from a little different angle and perspective 😉

🇺🇸 THE F-16 MAY BE COMING BACK TO THE U.S. AIR FORCE — 21 YEARS AFTER THE LAST ONEThe USAF accepted its last new-build F...
18/09/2026

🇺🇸 THE F-16 MAY BE COMING BACK TO THE U.S. AIR FORCE — 21 YEARS AFTER THE LAST ONE

The USAF accepted its last new-build F-16 on 18 March 2005.

Now Lockheed Martin is pitching an advanced new variant — currently referred to by sources as the F-16G — as the Air Force looks for ways to rebuild fighter capacity.

No purchase has been approved. The USAF says it is still analysing options for its next spending plan and has not yet defined the exact requirement.

But the proposal is surprisingly concrete.

Aviation Week reports that the F-16G would build on the latest Block 70, adding conformal fuel tanks, 600-gallon wing tanks, infrared search-and-track, a Sniper targeting pod and a drag chute.

✈️ Which raises an obvious question:
Why would the country building the F-35, F-47 and hundreds of autonomous combat aircraft consider buying a fighter whose basic design first flew in 1974?

Because the USAF has a numbers problem.

It still operates around 826 F-16s, averaging roughly 34 years old. Meanwhile, its wider fighter inventory is below the current statutory minimum. Air Force planning suggests a substantially larger crewed fighter force may be required during the next decade.

Older fighters are aging out while F-35 and F-15EX production cannot necessarily replace every retiring aircraft quickly enough. F-47 and future CCA fleets, meanwhile, are still being built.

And that is where the real debate starts.

Why spend money on new non-stealth fighters while investing billions in next-generation survivability?

The counterargument is practical: not every mission requires stealth. A modern F-16 could add aircraft relatively quickly while using an existing production line, established infrastructure, trained personnel and decades of operational experience.

So this may not become a choice between F-16 or F-35.
It may become a question of whether the USAF needs both: enough high-end aircraft to pe*****te the hardest airspace, and enough affordable combat aircraft to keep squadrons populated everywhere else.

Twenty-one years after America bought its last new Fighting Falcon, the F-16 may be back in the conversation.

Follow The Stratos Brief for defence and aerospace developments explained in operational, industrial and policy context.

🇺🇸 AMERICA’S MOST SECRET AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE IS HEADING FOR MASS PRODUCTION — BUT IS RANGE REALLY THE POINT?For years, AI...
17/09/2026

🇺🇸 AMERICA’S MOST SECRET AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE IS HEADING FOR MASS PRODUCTION — BUT IS RANGE REALLY THE POINT?

For years, AIM-260 JATM was one of the least visible major U.S. weapons programmes. Its performance remains classified, and the first clear public photograph only emerged during testing in 2026.

On 17 September 2026, Lockheed Martin and the U.S. Department of War announced a framework agreement to rapidly increase production and deliveries of the Joint Advanced Tactical Missile, with Lockheed investing in additional manufacturing capacity.

The missile is being developed for the U.S. Air Force and Navy and will be carried by aircraft including the F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning II. Lockheed says JATM offers greater range and effectiveness than current U.S. air-to-air weapons, although its actual range, seeker performance, propulsion system and unit cost remain classified.

The programme began in 2018 as Washington sought an answer to increasingly capable Chinese long-range air-to-air missiles, particularly the PL-15 carried by aircraft including the J-20. AIM-260 is intended ultimately to succeed the AIM-120 AMRAAM while fitting inside U.S. stealth-fighter weapon bays.

Australia has also committed roughly $736 million to acquire JATM.
🎯 And this is where the professional debate gets interesting.

Public discussion often reduces modern beyond-visual-range combat to one question:
PL-15 range vs. AIM-260 range.

Real air combat is more complicated.

The reported use of Chinese-made PL-15s during the 2025 India–Pakistan air battle triggered immediate comparisons with Western missiles. But analysts interviewed by Reuters cautioned against judging capability by range alone.

Detection, electronic warfare, datalinks, off-board targeting, pilot tactics and the wider kill chain can determine whether a long-range missile ever gets a viable shot.

A stealthy F-22 or F-35 receiving targeting data from another sensor may be able to launch without exposing itself. Conversely, even an extremely long-range missile has limited value if the network feeding it cannot find, identify and track the target.

China is also continuing to develop longer-range air-to-air weapons beyond the PL-15.

So the most important question around AIM-260 may not be simply “How far can it fly?”

What matters now is that the programme is moving from secrecy and testing toward industrial scale.

And in a future Indo-Pacific air battle, the decisive contest may be less missile against missile than sensor network against sensor network — with AIM-260 and PL-15 delivering the final effect.

Follow The Stratos Brief for aerospace and defence developments explained beyond the headline.

17/09/2026

Your TV signal could help expose an aircraft trying not to be seen.

Passive radar turns the electromagnetic noise already surrounding us — television, radio and mobile transmissions — into a potential detection network.
No conventional radar pulse. No obvious emitter. Just existing signals, their reflections, and the ability to extract a picture from them.

Our latest Deep Dive explains how passive coherent location actually works, where its limits are, and why the technology is becoming increasingly relevant to modern air defence — including the debate around low-observable aircraft.

🎥 Watch the 50-second explainer below.

🔗 Full analysis in the comments.

🎤 ED SHEERAN’S U.S. TOUR IS NOW CAUGHT IN THE GAZA WAR DEBATEWhat began as a political statement on stage has turned int...
16/09/2026

🎤 ED SHEERAN’S U.S. TOUR IS NOW CAUGHT IN THE GAZA WAR DEBATE

What began as a political statement on stage has turned into one of the biggest music controversies of the week.

On 4 September 2026, rapper Macklemore used his supporting slot at Ed Sheeran’s MetLife Stadium show in New Jersey to voice support for Palestinians, including the phrase “Free Palestine.” He also performed Hind’s Hall, his protest song named after Hind Rajab, the five-year-old Palestinian girl killed in Gaza in 2024.

The reaction moved quickly beyond the concert itself.

According to tour promoter Messina Touring Group, several U.S. venues said they would not host shows if Macklemore remained on the bill. Macklemore specifically accused Robert Kraft, owner of Gillette Stadium and the New England Patriots, of helping push for his removal. Kraft has defended his position, saying support for Palestinian civilians should not come at the expense of the Jewish community or obscure Hamas’s responsibility for the 7 October attacks.

Macklemore was subsequently dropped from the remaining U.S. dates.

Then the story widened.

By 16 September, Finneas, Lukas Graham, Aaron Rowe and Beoga had all withdrawn from Sheeran’s U.S. tour in solidarity with Macklemore. Their statements differed in wording, but each framed the issue around freedom of expression, civilian suffering and opposition to silencing pro-Palestinian views.

Sheeran has tried to separate himself from the decision.

He said Macklemore’s removal was made by venues and the promoter, not by him, and that he had spent days trying to find a compromise. Sheeran also described the suffering of Israelis and Palestinians as a human tragedy and said he did not want to cancel shows that thousands of fans and workers depend on.

That distinction has not ended the controversy.

For Macklemore and the artists who withdrew, the dispute is about whether performers can speak publicly about Gaza, Palestinian civilians and Israeli military actions without commercial consequences.

For Kraft and others who supported the removal, the concern is that some of Macklemore’s rhetoric crossed from criticism of Israeli policy into language they view as harmful or antisemitic. Macklemore rejects that characterization.

So why is this relevant beyond celebrity news?

Because it shows how far the Israel–Gaza war has moved into Western cultural and commercial life.

A conflict fought thousands of kilometres away is now influencing stadium contracts, tour line-ups, corporate decisions, artist relationships and public arguments over where political expression ends and reputational risk begins.

And in this case, one sentence on stage was enough to reshape an entire U.S. tour.

Follow The Stratos Brief for defence, geopolitics and the wider consequences of contemporary conflict.

YOUR TV, RADIO AND MOBILE SIGNALS CAN HELP FIND ENEMY AIRCRAFTThe same electromagnetic signals that carry television, ra...
16/09/2026

YOUR TV, RADIO AND MOBILE SIGNALS CAN HELP FIND ENEMY AIRCRAFT

The same electromagnetic signals that carry television, radio and mobile communications can also illuminate the sky.

Modern passive radar systems exploit those existing transmissions to detect and track aircraft — without transmitting a conventional radar signal of their own.

📡 An FM or TV transmitter sends out a signal.
✈️ An aircraft reflects a tiny fraction of it.
🎯 A passive receiver compares the original signal with the reflection and turns the differences into a track.

That makes the technology particularly interesting for modern air defence. A passive sensor is far harder to locate through conventional electronic-support measures, can remain on continuously without advertising itself like an active radar, and may provide useful detection geometries against low-observable aircraft.

And this is no longer just laboratory research.

Poland is procuring a major PET/PCL capability for its integrated air-defence network. Germany has already connected HENSOLDT Twinvis into an air-defence command architecture. Australia is evaluating Silentium Defence’s MAVERICK family, while Finland is taking the same underlying principle into counter-battery sensing.

The next step may be even more consequential: researchers are already investigating whether LEO communications constellations such as Starlink could become illuminators of opportunity for passive radar.

In our latest The Stratos Brief Deep Dive, we explain how the technology works, what signals can be exploited, which countries are deploying it, what it really means for stealth aircraft — and why there is still no publicly verified passive-radar combat kill.

🔗 Link to the full Deep Dive is in the comments below.

🇺🇸 THE UNITED STATES JUST ACKNOWLEDGED IT HAS WEAPONS IN ORBITFor years, most public discussion about the weaponization ...
16/09/2026

🇺🇸 THE UNITED STATES JUST ACKNOWLEDGED IT HAS WEAPONS IN ORBIT

For years, most public discussion about the weaponization of space centered on what Russia or China might deploy next.

On 14 September 2026, Washington made its own position much more explicit.

Speaking at the Air, Space & Cyber Conference, Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink confirmed that the United States now has “on-orbit space control weapons” intended to protect U.S. forces against hostile action.

The Pentagon did not say what those systems are, how many are deployed, where they operate or who built them. It also did not disclose whether they are kinetic or non-kinetic.

That leaves a broad range of possibilities: orbital systems could jam communications, interfere with sensors, dazzle optical payloads, conduct close-proximity operations or physically disable another spacecraft.

For the first time, however, the U.S. has publicly acknowledged that a weaponized capability is already deployed in orbit.

🛰️ American officials have spent years warning that China and Russia are expanding counter-space capabilities, including electronic warfare, anti-satellite missiles, directed-energy systems and maneuverable spacecraft.

Washington frames its own systems around deterrence, protection of the joint force and space superiority.

Beijing and Moscow reacted very differently.

🇨🇳 China warned against turning outer space into a battlefield and said further military expansion risks accelerating an arms race.

🇷🇺 Russia similarly argued that space should remain free of weapons and criticized further militarization.

Military competition in space is therefore no longer theoretical. The argument is increasingly about how far that competition should go, and which capabilities each side is willing to describe as defensive.

⚖️ The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit, but it does not impose a blanket ban on conventional orbital weapons.

The U.S. has demonstrated anti-satellite capability before. The ASM-135 ASAT test in 1985 and the destruction of USA-193 by an SM-3 in 2008 are two of the best-known examples.

In both cases, the weapon was launched from Earth against an object in space.

Meink has now confirmed a different category of capability: the weapon itself is already on orbit.

A senior U.S. Space Command official later described the acknowledgement as a “landmark” moment.

Space did not become a military domain this week. Satellites have supported targeting, intelligence, communications and navigation for decades.

What is new is that Washington is now saying openly what it previously left unconfirmed:

The United States has weapons in orbit.

Their design, mission and rules of use remain classified.

🇺🇸 LEARN THESE NAMES: VENGEANCE AND FURY — THE U.S. AIR FORCE HAS NAMED ITS NEW UNCREWED FIGHTERSTomcat. Hornet. Apache....
15/09/2026

🇺🇸 LEARN THESE NAMES: VENGEANCE AND FURY — THE U.S. AIR FORCE HAS NAMED ITS NEW UNCREWED FIGHTERS

Tomcat. Hornet. Apache. Black Hawk. Lightning II.

For decades, aircraft names became part of the vocabulary of military aviation. You did not need to be a pilot to know what an F-14 Tomcat or F/A-18 Hornet was.

The next generation may have its own names to learn.

On 14 September 2026, at the Air & Space Forces Association’s Air, Space & Cyber Conference in National Harbor, Maryland, Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink formally named the USAF’s first Collaborative Combat Aircraft:

✈️ FQ-42 Vengeance — General Atomics
✈️ FQ-44 Fury — Anduril

Both were already public as the YFQ-42A and YFQ-44A development platforms. What changed was their formal identity as named U.S. Air Force aircraft.

And these names may become increasingly familiar.

The Air Force intends to acquire roughly 1,000 combat-ready, semi-autonomous CCAs, with Meink saying at least 500 should be in service by 2032. FQ-42 and FQ-44 have already moved beyond the demonstrator stage into engineering, manufacturing development and production.

🤖 Vengeance and Fury are purpose-built uncrewed combat aircraft designed to operate alongside crewed fighters, adding weapons, sensors and tactical mass without putting another pilot in every aircraft.

Increment 1 focuses primarily on air-to-air combat. Later increments could add strike, reconnaissance, electronic warfare and other missions.

The USAF also wants mission-autonomy software to evolve separately from the airframe, allowing different providers to update capabilities without redesigning the aircraft itself.

⚙️ Fury has already demonstrated how far the concept has progressed.
On 15 July 2026, a YFQ-44A fired an AIM-120 AMRAAM during a live-fire test over the Mojave Desert. Parts of the engagement sequence were conducted autonomously within operator-defined parameters.

The USAF says weapon release remains a human decision.

Alongside 500 CCAs planned for 2032, the Air Force also wants 500 lower-cost Massed Modular Aircraft for strike and ISR missions by the same year.

If those plans survive funding and production realities, U.S. tactical aviation could enter the 2030s with more than a thousand new autonomous combat-oriented aircraft operating alongside F-35s, F-47s and other crewed platforms.

For industry, that means demand for airframes, autonomy software, engines, sensors, datalinks and weapons integration. For air forces, it means learning to command formations in which many aircraft may have no pilot onboard.

A previous generation learned Tomcat, Hornet and Lightning.

The next one may need to remember Vengeance and Fury.

Follow The Stratos Brief for defence and aerospace developments explained in operational, industrial and policy context.

The news tells you what happened. WE FOCUS ON WHAT IT MEANS.The Stratos Brief turns developments across aerospace, defen...
15/09/2026

The news tells you what happened. WE FOCUS ON WHAT IT MEANS.

The Stratos Brief turns developments across aerospace, defence, business aviation, space and strategic technology into clear, independent analysis — connecting platforms with procurement, industry, operations, markets and geopolitics.

For decision-makers. For industry. And for anyone who prefers signal over noise.

Follow The Stratos Brief for Insights, Deep Dives and analysis that goes beyond the headline.

🇱🇹 NATO FIGHTER SHOOTS DOWN UNIDENTIFIED DRONE OVER LITHUANIALithuania recorded a rare escalation in Baltic airspace sec...
15/09/2026

🇱🇹 NATO FIGHTER SHOOTS DOWN UNIDENTIFIED DRONE OVER LITHUANIA

Lithuania recorded a rare escalation in Baltic airspace security early on 15 September 2026, when a NATO fighter shot down an unidentified drone over Lithuanian territory.

The incident began shortly after midnight, when Lithuanian authorities detected an unmanned aircraft moving westward across the country. An air-threat warning was initially issued for Vilnius city and district, Trakai and Elektrėnai, before being extended toward Kaunas County as the object continued its flight.

NATO fighters were scrambled in response.

✈️ The drone was eventually destroyed near Pratkūnai village in Kaišiadorys district, between Vilnius and Kaunas.

Lithuania’s National Crisis Management Centre said preliminary information suggested that the aircraft had probably entered Lithuanian airspace from Belarus, although its origin had not yet been established.

Centre chief Vilmantas Vitkauskas said investigators were sent to the crash site to determine the drone’s type, technical characteristics and likely purpose. Military Police, civilian police and other services secured the area and began examining the wreckage.

🇮🇹 The interception took place within NATO’s Baltic air-defence structure.
Since 31 July 2026, Italy has deployed four Eurofighter Typhoons and around 200 personnel to Šiauliai Air Basefor the current Baltic Air Policing rotation.

Lithuanian defence authorities praised the Lithuanian Armed Forces and the Italian pilots on duty for the speed of the response.

The timing is particularly relevant.

Only two days earlier, on 13 September, NATO aircraft were scrambled after radar contacts near Vilnius were initially assessed as possible drones. Visual identification later showed that the objects were a flock of birds.

The two incidents highlight one of the hardest problems in counter-UAS defence: detecting a small object is often easier than identifying exactly what it is and deciding whether it represents a real threat.

That matters well beyond Lithuania.

European militaries are increasingly investing in radars, passive sensors, electronic warfare, command-and-control systems and lower-cost interceptors able to deal with targets that are much smaller and cheaper than traditional aircraft.

At the same time, policymakers face increasingly practical questions about rules of engagement, cross-border incidents and the level of certainty required before an unidentified object can be engaged over allied territory.

For defence industry, the message is equally clear: counter-UAS is no longer a niche capability. It is becoming a permanent layer of European air defence.

The investigation is still ongoing, and Lithuania has not attributed the drone to any state or armed force.

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